Harjot Singh v. Atty Gen USA by unknown
2010 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-1-2010 
Harjot Singh v. Atty Gen USA 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010 
Recommended Citation 
"Harjot Singh v. Atty Gen USA" (2010). 2010 Decisions. 1047. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010/1047 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2010 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-4292
___________
HARJOT SINGH,
                                  Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A074-875-022)
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Henry S. Dogin
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 5, 2010
Before: MCKEE, FUENTES and VAN ANTWERPEN,  Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 1, 2010)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Harjot Singh petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA).  For the reasons below, we will deny the petition.
Singh, a native of India, entered the United States in 1994 without inspection.  In
21997, he adjusted his status to that of a permanent resident on a conditional basis based
on his marriage to a United States citizen.  Singh and his wife divorced in October 2003. 
In 2005, the District Director revoked Singh’s permanent resident status on the ground
that Singh had not established that he entered the marriage in good faith.  Because his
permanent status had been revoked, Singh was charged as removable.  Singh contested
removability and applied for a waiver of the joint filing requirement to remove the
conditions on his permanent resident status.  After a hearing, the IJ denied Singh’s
application for a waiver and ordered Singh removed to India.  The BIA dismissed Singh’s
appeal.  It found no clear error in the IJ’s determination that Singh had failed to prove that
he married his ex-wife in good faith.  Singh filed a timely petition for review.
In order to remove the conditional basis of the permanent resident status, an alien
and his spouse must file a joint petition requesting removal of the conditional basis.  8
U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(1).  If the alien fails to file a joint petition, the Attorney General may,
as a matter of discretion, remove the conditional basis if the alien shows that the marriage
was entered in good faith but has been terminated.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B).  We
lack jurisdiction to review the discretionary denial of waivers under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1186a(c)(4).  Urena-Tavarez v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 154, 161 (3d Cir. 2004).  Thus, we
may not address Singh’s argument that the IJ and the BIA improperly weighed the
evidence.  However, we do retain jurisdiction to review constitutional claims or questions
of law.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).
3Singh argues that the IJ erred by not requiring the government to produce the
investigator who wrote a report on which the government relied.  Under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(b)(4)(B), an alien shall have a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine witnesses
presented by the government.  To the extent that Singh is arguing that he was denied due
process, we have jurisdiction over his claim.  We review due process claims under a de
novo standard of review.  Fadiga v.Attorney General, 488 F.3d 142, 154 (3d Cir. 2007).
An alien is entitled to a full and fair hearing of his claim and a reasonable opportunity to
present evidence.  Singh v. Gonzales, 432 F. 3d 533, 541 (3d Cir. 2006). To succeed on a
due process claim, an alien must normally show substantial prejudice.  Id.  
The investigator had gone to the apartment building listed as the residence of
Singh and his wife and had spoken to their neighbors.  None of the neighbors knew of
Singh or his wife, and someone else’s name was on the door.  The government indicated
at the hearing that the investigator no longer worked for the government.  The BIA
concluded that the government made reasonable efforts to locate the investigator but had
determined that he was no longer employed by the Department of Homeland Security. 
See Hernandez-Guadarrama v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 674, 681-82 (9th Cir. 2005)
(government may not use affidavit from absent witness unless it establishes that it was
unable to present the witness despite reasonable efforts); Ocasio v. Ashcroft, 375 F.3d
105, 107 (1st Cir. 2004) (same); Olabanji v. INS, 973 F.2d 1232, 1234-35 (5th Cir. 1992)
(same).  Singh did not challenge the government’s assertion that the investigator was
4unavailable.
 The IJ took into account the landlord’s testimony that Singh lived at the apartment
for many years.  The IJ observed that the substance of the investigative report was
actually consistent with Singh’s testimony that he drove a truck for a living and was often
away from home.  
But it is consistent with [Singh’s] story.  If he is never around, comes in once in a
while, it is not unreasonable for anybody to say I have not seen this guy around.  I
believe he had a lease, I believe that [Singh] may have dropped by once in a while,
but all of this lack of knowledge about basic life with a wife, a cousin, not even
knowing about the wife being arrested, convicted, jailed for a six-month period
during this idyllic relationship between 1996 and ‘03, leads me to believe this is a
sham.
A.R. at 73-74.  Thus, the IJ did not rely on the investigator’s report to find that the
marriage was a sham.  He was more troubled by Singh’s lack of knowledge of his wife’s
arrest history and the time she spent in jail.  Therefore, Singh was not prejudiced by the
admission of the investigator’s report.
Singh also claims that the IJ assumed the role of a handwriting expert in
questioning his ex-wife’s signature on a letter.  However, the IJ explicitly disclaimed any
expertise in handwriting analysis and only observed that the signature on the letter was
very different from the signature on the joint tax returns Singh had submitted. The IJ did
not reject the letter based on his suspicions regarding her signature; rather, he discussed
and considered its content.  In the letter, Singh’s ex-wife stated that she and Singh had
loved each other but things had not worked out between them.  A.R. at 171.  The IJ noted
5that she did not mention her arrests or drug abuse.  He also pointed out that the ex-wife
stated that the marriage lasted “a couple of years” even though she and Singh were
married for seven years.  A.R. at 12-13.  Singh was not prejudiced by any comments the
IJ made about the signatures.
For the above reasons, we will deny the petition for review.
